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1 . Introduction 
Criminal punishment for infringement of the Antimonopoly Act(1) of 
Japan has obtained since its enactment in 1947. There are criminal penalties 
both for substantive offences and procedural violations. The former(2) 
(1) Its formal title is "Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance 
of Fair Trade", which prohibits private monopolization (excluding or controlling the 
business activities of other entrepreneurs), unreasonable restraint of trade (cartel) , 
unfair trade practices (group boycott, price discrimination, sales below cost, resale price 
maintenance, abuse of dominant bargaining position and so on) and anticompetitive 
merger & acquisition. 
(2) The heavirest one of these penalties, which are provided by Art.89, 90 and 91 of the 
Antimonopoly Act, is imprisonment for up to 5 years and/or a fine not exceeding 5 
million yen on an individual and 500 million yen against a corporation (100 yen = 0.85 
euro on Feb. I , 2011) against unreasonable restraint of trade or private monopolization 
after the amendment of 2009. At the time of the original enactment it stipulated 
imprisonment for up to 3 years and/or a fine not exceeding 30 thousands yen against 
both an individual and a corporation. 
The unfair trade practices are excepted from the range of criminalization. 
The Antimonopoly Act was introduced into Japanese business society as new 
legislation after the Second World War. The institutionalization of criminal punishment 
showed Japanese businessmen that cartels and other anticompetitive conduct 
were serious illegalities harming public welfare. But the existence of such criminal 
punishment did not immediately lead to its actual use. The JFTC brought charges of 
two cartels to the Public Prosecutor's Office for the first time in 1974, 25 years after 
enactment. They were the restraints of petroleum products by large refinery companies 
on the occasion of the first oil crisis in 1973. One was price-fixing and the other was 
restraint of production. The judgments by the Tokyo High Court were issued in 1984 
after ten years. The former was convicted, but the latter was acquitted. From these 
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prohibits anticompetitive behavior and the latter(3) prevents entrepreneurs 
from avoiding investigative activities by the JFTC (The Japan Fair Trade 
Commission). This paper focuses on the former(4) and discusses the 
functions of the criminal punishment of anticompetitive behaviror prohibited 
by the Antimonopoly Act. 
Criminal punishment sits on the top of the pyramid(5) of measures 
because of its severity. It is necessary to reconsider which type of 
anticompetitive behavior should actually be penalized since Japanese 
legislation provides that criminalization is relatively broad in scope. 
There is another practical reason for reconsideration. It is the surcharge 
system. This was introduced into the Antimonopoly Act in 1977, to impose 
monetary fines of up to 100/0 of the total sales of a corporation convicted of 
experiences the JFTC and the Public Prosecutor's Office understood the difficulties and 
the cost of obtaining a criminal conviction in cartel cases. See Nobuo Gohara "Japanese 
Structure ofAntimonopoly Law" (Seibunsha, 2004) pp.54, 55. 
The JFrC tried a prosecution again in 1991 against the price-raising cartel of plastic 
wrapping films, 17 years after the petroleum products cartels. It obtained a conviction 
from the Tokyo High Court in 1994. Afterwards until now 13 cases (cartels and bid-
riggings) were accused by the JFTC and convicted by the Court through indictment of 
the Public Prosecutor's Office. 
(3) The heavirest of these penalties, which are provided by Art.91-2,92-2, 94 and 94-2, is 
imprisonment of between 3 months and 10 years against a false testimony in hearing 
proceedings by the JFTC. 
(4) This does not mean that criminal sanctions against procedural violations are 
insignificant. The investigative process is also very important and it is a very serious 
offence for companies or individuals to prevent investigative activities of the JFTC 
from detecting related facts. Such conduct depends on individuals' response rather 
than companies, because they are not business activities. Therefore the necessity of 
criminalization, especially against individuals, is maybe greater against procedural 
violations rather than substantive offences. The JFTC has been planning to accuse 
procedural violations, but it has done not yet. 
(5) The Antimonopoly Act has three dimensions of measures or sanctions against its 
violations; cease and desist orders and surcharge payment order as administrative 
measure by the JFTC, private suits for claiming compensation of damages and criminal 
punishment as the most severe. 
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a cartel violation(6). The original Act provided from the outset for a cease 
and desist order by the JFllC and a criminal judgment by the Court, but the 
Antimonopoly Act in its revised and current form has a surcharge payment 
order by the JFTC as an administrative measure between two former 
measures. The Japanese Antimonopoly Act is characterized by the potential 
coexistence(7) of two kinds of administrative orders and judicial penalties. 
2. Nature and Role of Criminal Punishment 
Surcharge payment orders by the JFTC are imposed on corporations 
through the administrative procedure. Crirninal penalties are handed down 
by the Court on individuals and corporations through criminal proceedings 
initiated by the public prosecution supported by a written accusation from 
the JFTC. Both measures are disadvantageous to guilty parties. There 
is a difference between administrative and criminal sanctions. However, 
(6) One of the reasons to establish the surcharge system additionally was the troublesome 
process of trying to obtain a criminal conviction against the petroleum products cartel. 
The JFllC must order violating firms to pay surcharge as non-discretionary measure, 
when it has confirmed price cartels, bid-rigging, supply or purchase volume cartels 
and market sharing cartels. The calculating rate multiplied sales amount of the relevant 
goods or services by such a cartel was 2"/* at the amendment of 1977, afterwards 
was raised up to 6"/* at the amendment of 1991 and the present rate is 10"/* since the 
amendment of 2005. According to the recent amendment of 2009, objects of the 
surcharge system have been extended to exclusionary private monopolization (6"/*) , 
particular unfair trade practices (3"/") and abuse of dominant bargaining position (1"/.). 
The largest amount of surcharge against cartels imposed until now was 27 billion yen on 
one case and 7.9 billion yen on one firm. 
(7) In addition to ordering cease and desist measures and surcharge payments, the JFTC 
may accuse violating firms of a crime against the Antimonopoly Act simultaneously. 
Japanese business society criticized such sirnultaneous sanctioning by both 
administrative surcharge and criminal fine as double jeopardy in violation of the 
Constitution Art.39. But the Court rejected such criticism because of the difference 
of both sanctions, namely, the surcharge aims to make a violating firm disgorge 
unjust enrichment gained through illegality by means of administrative measure 
and procedure, and the fine aims at the factors of anti-society and anti-morality in a 
violation and punishes such reproachable behaviror by means of judicial judgment and 
proceedings (price-raising cartel of plastic wrapping films. Tokyo High Court Decision 
of May 21, 1994). 
42 ~~~~~~~~~<~j(~~F~t*~~~f ~~ 5 ~* (2oul~~ro)~) 
the difference between them should not be measured in monetary terms 
alone. Criminal penalties have the following characteristics: one is the so-
called stigma effect whereby criminal punishment confirms certain types 
of anticompetitive behavior as an absolute evil in our economic society 
based on the free market mechanism. The other is the dishonor attaching 
to each individual convicted of failing in his responsibilities at corporate 
level. Criminal punishment has more impressive power over violators than 
administrative sanctions. This makes criminal punishment the most severe 
sanction of all against anticornpetitive conduct. In other words criminal 
punishment is located on the top of a pyramid rising from mild methods at its 
base to radical methods at its pinnacle, and criminal punishment is also the 
final measure based on the ultima ratio principle. Accordingly care must be 
exercised lest there is excessive repression of free business activities, where 
criminal punishment is used too widely and indiscriminately and there is 
over criminalization. This rs the problem of the "false posiuve" to which we 
now turn. 
Fines as pecuniary penalties can be imposed on both corporations and 
individuals in Japan(8). It means that both are compelled to pay money which 
is seen as being as valuable and as limited as one's personal lifespan. Its main 
aim is that high-level legal disapproval is emphasized by the levying of a 
fine, which is criminal in nature. The disapproval factor differential between 
surcharges and fines derives from a procedural distinction. Surcharges 
(8) The upper limit of frnes on corporations is higher than it is on individuals. These 
limitations in the Antimonopoly Act were separated by the amendment of 1992 as the 
first legislative example with the differential between corporations and individuals, 
although there had been the legislative convention until then that the same level of 
fines between both of them was enacted formally and nominally against corporate 
delinquency. It was the moment when substantial criminalization against corporations 
was considered from the Antimonopoly Act initially and it became a starting point for 
introducing the same amendments into the environment laws and the financial laws. 
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are imposed by way of administrative procedure by the JFTC, whereas 
fines are ordered by the Court following a public prosecution supported by 
accusations or charges brought by the JFTC. Given the difference between 
administrative and penal sanctions it will be understood that a guilty 
party will suffer greater dishonor from a fine than from a surcharge. The 
psychological sanction of a fine is more severe than that of a surcharge, even 
if the respective amounts may be similar. But these are relative concepts 
and it is difficult to discern an absolute distinction between fines and 
surcharges(9). Both make for atonement by the payment of money . (ro) 
Criminal punishment, however, has another way, namely imprisonment. 
It focuses on individuals only. Imprisonrnent deprives them of a portion of 
their valuable and limited lifespan. It condemns them to isolation from their 
own general society. It publicizes widely their social guilt. Imprisonment, 
of course, cannot target corporations. But it compels individuals to seclude 
themselves irom their business circles, their, communities and families. The 
essence of criminalization is imprisonment. The harshness of imprisonment 
for white-collar offenders produces intensive stigma effects and feelings 
(9) On corporate level there is some resemblance about the sanctioning function 
between a surcharge and a fine, since the amendments of 2005 and 2009 set up 
500/, or 100"/* increment of surcharge amount against the second violation (Art.7-
2(7)) and/or main promoters of cartels (Art.7-2(8) and 200/0 reduction for early 
withdrawal from cartels (Art.7-2(6)). 
(10) Since the amendment of 2005 the Antimonopoly Act provides a systematic influence 
from a fme to a surcharge in Japan (Art.7-2(19) and Art.51). If there is a final and 
binding decision regarding the same case sentencing the relevant entrepreneurs 
to a fine, the JFTC deducts the amount equivalent to one-half of the said fine from 
the original sum. The first case was the JFTC's decision of Nov. 11, 2009 against 3 
manufacturers regarding the price-raising cartel of plating steel plates, which had been 
sentenced fines by the Tokyo District Court on Sep. 15, 2009. 
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of dishonor to their flesh and blood existences(11). Additionally, those 
people and those around them have already received dishonorable feelings 
inevitably through arrest and custody during the investigative process before 
imprisonment by judgment. Consequently, the prominent characteristic 
of criminal punishment is the capability to investigate an individual's 
responsibility and impose imprisonment on him(12) 
Thus the JFTC has to find out and point out an individual who should 
take a responsibility as an offender from a corporate organization in order 
to apply criminal punishment. In case of an administrative measure, it 
is enough for the JFTC to judge whether corporations have carried out 
anticompetitive conduct. But the JFTC with the Public Prosecutor's Office 
needs to deepen its investigative activities on individual level, if it is to apply 
criminal punishment. The difference demonstrates that the enforcement 
cost of criminal punishment is inevitably higher than for administrative 
(11) With regard to business crimes such as violations of the Antimonopoly Act, Prof. 
Saeki said "penalizing executives of companies with imprisonment may be too stern 
as its practical effect. How large actual torment of imprisonment is, depends on each 
person variously. It cannot be said that the torment is same between common white-
collar people and gangsters with previous conviction, even if their each term of sentence 
is identical. From the monetary viewpoint it can be found that there is the prominent 
difference in torment effects brought by one-year sentence to an office worker with 
annual salary of 10 million yen and a gangster without a respectable business. The 
former's damage is, of course, more serious than the latter's." Hitoshi Saeki, 'The 
Theory of Sanctions' (Yuhikaku, 2009) p.42. In Japan every individual accused of 
violations against the Antimonopoly Act has been judged by imprisonment with 
probation and there is no example of unsuspended sentence of imprisonment until now. 
Fines were imposed without exception. 
(12) The Criminal Law of Japan provides that bid-rigging for impeding fair prices or 
getting unjust profit is a crime with imprisonment for up to 2 years or a fine not 
exceeding 2.5 million yen (Art.96-3(2)). Against bid-rigging it is possible to apply both 
the Antimonopoly Act and the Criminal Law. Since the core function of the Criminal 
Law is the prosecution of individual' responsibility, it does not refer to corporations. It 
is also important for criminal punishment of the Antimonopoly Act to refer to not only 
individuals but also corporations (Art.95) . 
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procedures(1 3) 
From the foregoing the following two points can be made about the role 
of criminalization in the Antimonopoly Act. 
First, criminal punishment by the Court through the Public 
Prosecutor's Office should be expected, where an administrative order by 
the JFTC would not have a sufficient deterrence effect. By the statement 
"The JFTC's Policy on Criminal Accusation and Compulsory Investigation of 
Criminal Cases regarding Antimonopoly Violations"(14), the JFTC announced 
"vicious and serious cases which are considered to have widespread 
influence on people's livings" and "violation cases involving those firms 
or industries who are repeat offenders or those who do not abide by the 
elimination orders" as warranting criminal charges.. 
Secondly, the invocation of criminal proceedings against anticompetitive 
cases is competent where an individual's conduct involves personal criminal 
liability. 
But anticompetitive cases prohibited by the Antimonopoly Act 
(13) The new investigation procedure for criminal cases was introduced into the 
Antimonopoly Act (Art.100ff.) by the amendment of 2005. For this compulsory 
investigation specialized in suspected criminal cases the JFTC's staff members have to 
request a permit issued in advance by a judge of the district court or summary court. 
The amendment aimed to keep a due process for criminal cases mainly, but it also 
expected that the JFTC and the Public Prosecutor's Office would be able to co-operate 
with each other from the initial step of criminal investigation before an accusation, 
because of the new procedure equivalent to criminal proceedings. By virtue of such 
cooperation the investigation cost might decrease theoretically, but this does not alter 
the fact that in any case the enforcement cost of criminal punishment is higher than that 
of administrative measures. 
(14) This policy statement was published originally in June 1990 in order to give 
advance warning of the JFTC's active attitude to treat anticompetitive violations 
as criminal and it was revised in Oct. 2005 after the establishment of the 
compulsory investigation for criminal cases and the leniency program of 2005. By 
the way the JFTC proclaimed in the statement that it would file no accusation 
for criminal punishment against the first entrepreneurs which made use of the 
leniency program concerning immunity from surcharge and submitted reports and 
materials about violations before the beginning of the investigation. The Public 
Prosecutor's Office also agreed with this immunity. 
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are created by corporations alone and, not by individuals outside such 
organizations. It is most effective that each corporation makes an effort to 
prevent their executives and employees from committing anticompetitive 
offences by means of a systematic compliance framework in order to 
(15) discipline indiviidual' behavior . It is most appropriate to impose significant 
sanctions on corporations themselves. As against any individuals, who 
belong to corporations engaged in anticompetitive behavior the application 
of criminal penalties might suppress free business activities excessively. 
Criminal punishment is so severe that it can make business people too 
nervous, such as to impede the creative initiative of entrepreneurs and 
discourage the business activities of firms. If so, criminal punishment would 
shows negative cost effectiveness, because criminal proceedings are more 
expensive to run. 
As a tentative conclusion, it may be said that a prerequisite for criminal 
punishment should be factual circumstances which give reasonable grounds 
for criminal charges against individuals as distinct from corporations. This 
might arise where an individual had been playing a significant role in the 
anticompetitive conduct of his corporation by methods beyond the pale of 
ordinary business practice. 
3 . Type of Anticompetitive Conduct fit for Criminal Punishment 
Anticompetitive actions are divided substantially into two groups; 
(15) The Court tends to hold a good opinion of compliance activities in companies which 
guide their employees not to violate the Antimonopoly Act. Several convictions took 
into account the indicted companies' efforts to prevent their employees from repeating 
offenses as mitigating circumstances (Bid-rigging of steel frameworks of bridges to the 
Ministry of National Land & Transportation and the Japan, Highway Public Corporation 
Tokyo High Court Decisions of Nov. 10, 2006, Sep. 21, 2007. Bid-rigging of human waste 
treatment facilities to local communities, Osaka District Court Decisions of Mar. 12, 
Mar. 15, May 17, 2007). 
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collusive or concerted conduct and unilateral conduct. 
Concerted conduct is anticompetitive behavior among independent 
firms in a certain market where they exchange information with each other, 
increase interdependence so as to avoid rival activities, and induce other 
firms to behave cooperatively through tactical communication. By means 
of such concerted conduct they are able to decrease the competitive risk in 
a market where information about other firms is not so transparent: such 
market situation can be explained by reference to the prisoner's dilemma 
theory. Contrary to concerted conduct, unilateral conduct does not contain 
any factors of tactical communication, and cornprises anticompetitive 
behavior by a single firm or entity of its own will and on its own. 
US antitrust law and EU competition law have two basic articles. One 
corresponds to concerted conduct (Sherman Act Sec.1 and EU Treaty 
Art.101 (1)) and the other corresponds to unilateral conduct (Sherman Act 
Sec.2 and EU Treaty Art.102). The Antimonopoly Act of Japan also has 
two basic concepts of anticompetitive conduct. One is the prohibition of 
"private monopolization" and the other is the prohibition of "unreasonable 
restraint of trade". But these two concepts are distinguished by criteria 
slightly different than those used by the US and the EU. The core concept is 
"private monopolization" which is defined as conduct to exclude or control 
business activities of other firms by a single firm or by conspiracy with 
other firms, and that of "unreasonable restraint of trade" is to restrict or 
carry out business activities mutually with other firms. Then it is clear that 
"unreasonable restraint of trade" is concerted conduct, but unilateral and 
concerted conduct may mingle in "private monopolization". 
According to the present Antimonopoly Act of Japan like the 
Sherman Act Sec.1 and 2, both unreasonable restraint of trade and private 
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monopolization can be prosecuted as an object of criminal punishment under 
the terms of Articles .89 and 95. In spite of such stipulations, it is one of the 
questions of this paper whether all types of anticompetitive conduct belong to 
the concept of unreasonable restraint of trade and/or private monopolization 
and whether the Act should actually be used to punish individuals along with 
their corporations. 
From this viewpoint, first of all, it is necessary to examine the needs 
of criminal punishment against unilateral conduct which is contained in the 
concept of private monopolization. A unilateral conduct, excluding business 
activities of other firms, by a single firm, is part of private monopolization 
in Japanese Law and it is called exclusionary private monopolization. 
Concerning exclusionary private monopolization, the JFTC declared in its 
guidelines of October 2009 that it would prioritize a case where the share 
of the iproduct that said entrepreneur supplies exceeded approximately 
500/0, when deciding whether to investigate the case as exclusionary private 
monopolization. But competitive activities in a market are an aggregation 
of business endeavors to obtain trade opportunities by excluding other 
competitors, and it is proper that the entrepreneur exceeding 500/0 of 
market share is not prohibited to develop such competitive activities. If 
a firm has not any improper and inefficient elements in its competitive 
behavior, it is rather desirable for consumer welfare that a monopolistic 
firm behaves competitively. Therefore it is difficult and delicate whether 
or not exclusionary private monopolization by a single firm should be 
regulated by the Arrtimonopoly Act, if it is the case that the said firm is 
enlarging its market share by virtue of some competitive actions, because 
ordinary business activities and improper competitive conduct cannot be 
distinguished so easily. 
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It is not a subject of this paper what an improper conduct is, but it 
must be stressed that it is not so simple to tell improper conduct from 
ordinary business activities clearly. Additionally, dealings on exclusive 
terms, tie-in sales and so on, even if they were in a similar manner, cannot 
be distinguished clearly whether they are illegal or not, because they are 
not regulated in case of conduct by firms with no monopoly power. The 
above-mentioned guidelines also recognized that "because of the difficulty 
in distinguishing exclusionary conduct from normal business activities 
leading to exclude business activities of other entrepreneurs, it has been 
pointed out that the introduction of a surcharge against exclusionary private 
monopolization might cause a so-called chilling effect for efitrepreneurs 
and interfere with their fair and free business activities". The guideline 
shows, in addition to the subjective requisite of market share exceeding 500/0, 
"below-cost pricing" , "exclusive dealing" "tying" and "refusal to supply and 
discriminatory treatment" as types of exclusive conduct, but every type stays 
still ambiguous whether it can stand out from normal business activities. 
Even if a firm targeted another competitor with the specific intent of 
compelling it to leave its market, it could not be asserted that such conduct 
might give rise to a criminal penalty. Because under actual competition 
rivals do target each other. If there were a possibility of criminal penalty for 
aggressive conduct in the competitive process, entrepreneurs might refrain 
from positive competitiveness for fear of criminal sanction. If a monopolistic 
firm were obliged to refrain from competing by denying its business 
ireedom, there would be no consumer welfare gain. 
The core of this discussion is not the above-mentioned ambiguity 
between legality and illegality, but the shape and form of a suitable system 
of treatment for conduct of this sort of ambiguous nature. An administrative 
50 ~~~~~~~~~!~~<~~~~F"*~~~f ~~ 5 ~~~ (2011~1~10j~1) 
order like a cease and desist order, which can get rid of anticompetitive 
conduct for the future, may be applied to anticompetitive conduct the 
unlawfulness of which depends on market situations. On the other hand, 
greater caution is required before applying criminal sanctions to conduct, 
the illegality of which was insufficiently foreseeable at the relevant time. 
Exclusionary private monopolization by a single firm is not suitable 
to be punished criminally, because it belongs to the category of the above-
mentioned ambiguous type of conduct. If such conduct were punished 
criminally and if illegality were not foreseeable in advance, this would lead 
to the so-called "false positive" and suffocate large firms' active business 
behavirors which are also fundamentally expected as well as those of small-
medium-sized firms for vigorous competition among market participants. 
The object of criminal punishment has been addressed to concerted 
conduct by some firms with their mutual communication in an artificial 
way. Such communication is enhanced by direct contact among individuals 
belonging to each firm. The more eagerly they contact each other, the 
more robust their mutual confidence becomes. The more ingeniously they 
devise restraints of trade, the more invisible their conspiracy becomes to the 
competition authority. The nature of these behaviors is performed just by 
each individual. That is the reason why criminal punishment can be applied 
to concerted conduct in this respect. 
But it cannot be said yet that the competition authority may punish 
every anticompetitive concerted conduct criminally. There is no general 
principle which prohibits any cornmunication in an artificial way. If there 
were such a principle in the business world, it would make daily activities 
impossible, because inevitably firms need lots of communication with other 
firms in order to develop their business. The practicable view of punishing 
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all concerted conduct criminally is also not suitable. The target of criminal 
punishment must be further narrowed within the category of concerted 
conduct. 
In the case of the Antimonopoly Act of Japan, surcharge payments are 
limited to cartels concerning price, supply or purchase volume, market 
share and transaction counterparties within unreasonable restraint of trade, 
namely, they are the so-called "hard-core cartels". It is too sudden to punish 
criminally "non-hard-core cartels" which are located outside of surcharge 
payment orders. There is no necessity to apply criminal penalties to "non-
hard-core cartels", unless they are "disguised cartels". 
According to the Antimonopoly Act, the JFTC must order firms, which 
have taken part in hard-core cartels, to pay surcharges to the national 
treasury (Art.7-2). Criminal punishment is an additional measure to a 
surcharge payment order in Japan. Usually thinking, a surcharge payment 
order is enough to sanction such a hard-core cartel by levying an arnount of 
money to make a participating firm disgorge its unjust profit gained from 
illegal conduct. Every firm is expected to manage and instruct its executives 
and employees in order not to plan or take part in a hard-core cartel again by 
thinking about the irnposed expensive surcharge. 
Then we will ponder whether individuals should be punished criminally 
beyond corporate persons and surcharge payment orders. The necessary 
communication for creating and maintaining hard-core cartels plays 
an important role in strengthening mutual reliance among competing 
participants and decreasing the risks of competition, rivalry or cheating. 
The quality of such communication depends on the personalities of 
individuals. Hard-core cartels are enhanced and reinforced by the behavior 
of individuals. There exists the necessity and the possibility to pursue the 
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criminal responsibility of individuals. 
In the above-mentioned policy statement of the JFTC with regard 
to criminal accusation, types of violations to be accused criminally are 
illustrated with "price-fixing cartels, supply restraint cartels, market 
allocation, bid-rigging, group boycotts, private monopolization and other 
violations which substantially restrain competition in certain areas of trade" . 
It is reasonable that the object of criminal punishment is concentrated 
mainly on hard-core cartels where there is clear illegality and no ambiguity 
(1 6) as to foreseeability . 
In case of private monopolization, if it contains a factor of communication 
between independent firms as fact, it can be allowed to become a target of 
(17) criminal punishment, except by a single firm . Such refined definition is 
necessary for criminal punishment. 
4. Factor for Pursuit of Criminal Punishment 
Criminal punishment should be attempted by the JFTC, in case an 
administrative order (cease and desist order and surcharge payment order) 
might be insufficient and ineffective as a measure against hard-core cartels. 
For criminal cases the JFrC exemplifies in the above-mentioned policy the 
following two points: " (i) vicious and serious cases which are considered 
to have wide spread influence on people's livings, and (ii) among violation 
(16) In the U.S.A., the actually indicted cases correspond to hard-core cartels (price-
fixing agreement, bid-rigging, market allocation etc.) which are covered by the clearer 
criterion "per se illegal" of the Sherman Act Sec.1 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 
"Criminal Antitrust Litigation Handbook, 2d ed." (ABA Publishing, 2006) p.259). In the 
U.K. and Canada criminal punishment targets similar sorts of arrangements as cartel 
offences (Enterprise Act Sec.188 in the U.K. and Competition Act 45 in Canada). 
( 17) In case of using ethically reproachable exclusionary methods by a single firm, for 
example coercion, compulsion, slander, character assassination and so on, the JFrC may 
accuse such private monopolization as a criminal case, since private monopolization has 
been also criminalized in the Antimonopoly Act. But these supposed cases stray from 
this paper's argumentation. 
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cases involving those firms or industries who are repeat offenders or 
those who do not abide by the elimination measures, those cases for which 
the administrative measures by the JFTC are not considered to fulfill the 
purpose of the Antimonopoly Act". It means that the criterion is not the 
economic scale of large firms or significant industries but the viciousness 
and seriousness of repetition. By way of illustration if (i) firms and their 
individuals consistently disparage compliance and (ii) the individuals actively 
seek out means to avoid and ignore the Antimonopoly Act, then the criteria 
of viciousness and seriousness of repetition are met. In these circumstances 
there is criminal liability. The anticompetitive effect of hard-core cartels is 
so obvious and their illegality is so apparent that businessmen may have no 
doubt about compliance with the Antimonopoly Act in advance. 
It is the conclusion of this paper that the target of criminal punishment 
is narrowed to hard-core cartels including private monopolization with 
communication by some firms under the Antimonopoly Act of Japan. 
According to our practical experiences until now, only hard-core cartels have 
been prosecuted as criminal cases. In the recent criminal cases the Court 
pointed out in each judgment (i) too low a level of compliance spirit and (ii) 
active devices and tactics by individuals as factors for criminal punishrnent. 
Several examples are as follows; 
(1) In the waterworks meter manufacturing industry, where the JFTC twice 
exposed bid-rigging, the manufacturers were convicted of bid-rigging in 
1997. In the case of the third bid-rigging in 2002, the responsibility of the 
companies and the individuals was very heavy, because they had repeated 
similar antlcompetitive conduct more deviously in spite of awareness of the 
previous crime (Bid-rigging of waterworks meters to Metropolitan Tokyo, 
Tokyo District Court Decisions of Mar. 26, Apr. 30 and May 21, 2004). 
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(2) The companies in the construction industry for steel frameworks of 
bridges had a clever scheme for exercising strict control on participants 
with countermeasures against outsiders in order to ensure the actual 
success of the bid-rigging (Bid-rigging of steel frameworks of bridges to 
the Ministry of National Land & Transportation and the Japan Highway 
Corporation. Tokyo High Court Decisions of Nov. 10, 2006 and Sep. 21, 
2007) . 
(3) The firms still continued bid-rigging, although they had to learned of 
its illegality and could have put a stop to their anticompetitive behavior on 
the occasion of the JFTC's investigation into another of their divisions (Bid-
rigging of human waste treatment facilities to local communities, Osaka 
District Court Decisions of Mar. 12, Mar. 15, and May 17, 2007). 
(4) The firms plotted to draw up no documents on the occasion of collusive 
construction allocation in order to leave no evidence and conducted 
such conspiracies with only oral communication (Bid-rigging of subway 
construction to Nagoya City, Nagoya District Court Decision of Oct. 23, 
2007) . 
(5) The firms had enough time to correct bad convention of bid-rigging, 
but they would not abolish such custom, since they had accepted the cease 
and desist order to the former bid-rigging and the surcharge payment order 
from the JFTC five years previously. It shows the paralysis of compliance 
spirit that the same individuals repeated similar bid-rigging (Bid-rigging 
of measurement works concerning paths in woods to the Green Resource 
Organization. Tokyo District Court Decision of Nov. 1, 2007) . 
(6) Many staffs of the firms took part in the collusive tendering extensively. 
They negotiated coordinated raising price rises gradually by organized 
process and methods with each other. After the JFTC's investigation into 
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another division for stainless steel plates of their firms, they abolished the 
whole meeting. But they would not stop their partial collusion and still held 
separate meetings (Price-raising cartel of plating steel plates, Tokyo District 
Court Decision of Sep. 15, 2009). 
5. Criminal Punishment and Hard-core Cartels as Organized Crime 
Hard-core cartels, which are apt to qualify for crirninal punishment, are 
crimes requiring accomplices, namely, joint offences. It is helpful to show 
how such accomplices related with each other in the process of organizing 
and maintaining a hard-core cartel. The relationship of accomplices in a 
hard-core cartel is three dimensional. 
First, there is an external joint relationship among the firms 
participating in the hard-core cartel. 
Secondly, there is an internal joint relationship among staff within a 
firm, especially between a superior and his staff. 
Thirdly, there is a collaborating joint relationship where a person 
outside the firms tries to facilitate a hard-core cartel. The typical case 
is leakage of confidential information to a particular bidder from the 
administrative agency which proposes a public bid. An official of the agency 
is able to instigate firms as bidders to organize bid-rigging in order to kick 
back a portion of unfair profit to him. 
Criminal punishment is capable to overcome the limitations of 
administrative means which can demonstrate only an external joint 
relationship among cartel participants, because the latter's objects are only 
entrepreneurs as corporations practically. The reach of criminal punishment 
may extend to an internal joint relationship and collaborating one because 
individuals are its essential target. Then it can develop the fact that hard-core 
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cartels are large-scale organized offences. 
The present situation concerning these dimensions in Japan is as 
f ollows: 
(1) External joint relationship 
Since hard-core cartels require complicity, individual participants in 
such conspiracies become co-principals (Art.60 of the Criminal Law) . The 
effect of the JFTC's criminal complaint to the Public Prosecutor's Office is to 
reach all participants, even if it had accused only a few persons (Art.238(2) 
of the criminal proceedings Law) . The period of prescription for indictment 
is five years (Art.250 N0.5 of the Criminal Proceedings Law) . 
(2) Internal joint relationship 
Inside of a firm there is a vertical line of staff consisting of superiors 
and partners. These people collude among themselves and with people of 
other firms. They have to accept criminal liability and proportional penalties 
for each act of complicity. In light of a crime organized by a firm, the 
Antimonopoly Act of Japan can punish not only individuals but also their firm 
as a juridical person by the fine of not exceeding 500 million yen (Art.95) . 
The representative, namely, the CEO of the relevant juridical person who 
has failed to take necessary measures to prevent such violation despite the 
knowledge of a plan for such violation or who has failed to take necessary 
measures to rectrfy such a violation despite the knowledge of violation, shall 
also be punished by the fine of not exceeding 5 million yen (Art.95-2) . This 
strict provision is a characteristic of Japanese Aritimonopoly legislation(18) 
(3) Collaborating joint relationship 
(18) This so-called "the third punishment provision" has not gained any chance to be 
applied yet. The leniency program introduced in 2005 might produce such a chance, if 
any CEO, who has been informed existence of a violation in his company, tried not to 
notify the JFTC of his knowledge through the program. 
The Function of Criminal Punishment under the Antimonopoly Act ot Japan (~~t7~c) 57 
The Antimonopoly Act regulates the behavior of firms and their staff 
as entrepreneurs, but it cannot target any persons without the status of 
entrepreneur. In a case where a non-entrepreneur, for example, an official 
of the construction agency, suggests bid-rigging to bidders in order to 
get a portion of profit from the bid-rigging, the Antimonopoly Act cannot 
be applied to him. In case of exercising criminal punishment, however, it 
is possible to make use of the theory of complicity without status by the 
Art.65(1) of the Criminal Law against him. 
There are three approaches that non-entrepreneurs are accused 
by the theory of complicity without status: (i) co-principals (Art.60) , (ii) 
instigation (Art.61) and (iii) accessory abetment (Art.62). The first case 
was the judgment concerning accessory to a staff of the Japan Sewerage 
Corporation, who had been making bid-rigging easier by leaking confidential 
cost/price information to bidders continuously (Bid-rigging of electric 
equipments for the Japan Sewerage Corporation, Tokyo High Court Decision 
of May 3, 1996) . 
Recently two cases have appeared where the Court judged executives 
of the public corporations as collusive co-principals, who had been indicating 
bidders to practice bid-rigging for mutual profits inclusive of securing well-
paying positions in each bidder's company for retired staff of the said public 
corporations (Bid-rigging of measurement works concerning paths in woods 
for the Green Resource Organization, Tokyo District Court Decision of 
Nov. 1, 2007. Bid-rigging of steel frameworks of bridges for the Ministry of 
National Land & Transportation and the Japan Highway Corporation, Tokyo 
High Court Decision of Dec. 7, 2007) . 
In the same period it was recognized as unreasonable that non-
entrepreneurs like governmental officials or the staff of public corporations 
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were not pursued for participation in anticompetitive behavior within 
the meaning of the Antimonopoly Act. In 2002 the National Diet enacted 
the new legislation "Act on Elimination, Prevention and Punishment of 
Participation in Bid Rigging by Bid's Organizers as Staffs of Government 
or Public Corporation". According to this Act, the JFTC may, when it 
recognizes a ministry's or a public corporation's participation in bid rigging 
as a result of its investigation, demand that the head of the said organization 
implement improvement measures which are necessary for eliminating such 
participation (Art.3) . Then the organization shall claim against participating 
staff for compensation of damage caused by the bid rigging (Art.4) , and 
investigate the causes for disciplinary actions against them (Art.5). By 
the amendment of 2007 the Act has contained the new provision that 
participating officials may be sentenced to imprisonment for up to 5 years or 
a fine not exceeding 2.5 million yen (Art.8) . 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper I have discussed what type of anticompetitive conduct 
prohibited by the Antimonopoly Act can fit into criminal punishment, and 
considered its functions beyond administrative measures. In light of the 
procedure, the determination whether or not a certain violation needs 
criminal punishment in addition to administrative measure, should depend 
on the JFTC as a specialized administrative agency for competition policy. 
From such meaning it is continuously significant that indictment against 
anticompetitive conduct shall be considered only after an accusation is filed 
by the JFTC (Art.96) and public prosecutors are permanently stationed in 
the general secretariat of the JFrC in order to ~eal with matters relating to 
violation cases (Art.35 (10) (1 1)) . 
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On the other hand the compulsory investigation proceedings for 
criminal cases were provided by the amendment of 2005. The new 
compulsory investigation needs a permit issued in advance by a judge 
of the Court, and it has stronger power than the investigation procedure 
for administrative measures. The JFTC set up the criminal investigation 
department for the new proceedings in its general secretariat. But it is still 
difficult for the JFTC to judge whether a suspected case is criminal or not in 
the initial stage, because administrative measures and criminal punishment 
co-exist side by side and the Antimonopoly Act does not distinguish 
provisions for these two measures. The JFTC must bear extra expense for 
preliminary investigation to collect evidence toward a criminal case, if it 
wants to detect a suspected case as a criminal from the start. Furthermore 
criminal proceedings require more cost including human resources than 
administrative proceedings. Criminal punishment has an inevitable limitation 
from both sides of legislation and expenditure. But criminal punishment 
remains the most effective method(19) to remind individuals, who are 
participating in competition, of compliance with the Antimonopoly Act and to 
deter cartel participation, even if the JFTC has not been able to complete so 
many criminal cases because of the necessity of broad and deep investigation 
with high attendant cost (20)(21) 
(19) See, e.g., Mark Jephcott "The Role of Cnmmal Enforcement" p 2183ff m ABA Section 
of Antitrust Law "Issues in Competition Law and Policy" Volume 3 (ABA Publishing, 
2008) . 
(20) Further iuformation regarding the competition law and policy of Japan is available in 
the Website of the JFrC (http://~Nw.jftc.go.jp). 
(21) This original draft for readers of other countries except Japan was placed in the "New 
Journal of European Criminal Law, volume 2/2011/01" p.45ff. 
